This website collects information and resources related to the threshold ECDSA signing schemes of Jack Doerner, Yashvanth Kondi, Eysa Lee, and abhi shelat, otherwise known as DKLs. As of May 2023, we have a new paper available! We present a three-round protocol for threshold ECDSA signing with malicious security against a dishonest majority, which information-theoretically UC-realizes a standard threshold signing functionality, assuming ideal commitment and two-party multiplication primitives. You may find a complete description of the protocol, along with a full proof of security and closed-form cost analysis, in eprint 2023/765.
Our new protocol was originally announced (in a now-superseded five-round variation) at IACR Real World Crypto 2023, as part of a talk that focused on the things we have learned via deployments and implementations of our previous works on this topic. The talk is available online. We consider our original t-of-n and 2-of-n threshold ECDSA signing protocols to be subsumed. Nevertheless, the original t-of-n protocol is available as eprint 2019/523, and the 2-of-n protocol is available in revised form as eprint 2018/499.
In addition to our works on threshold ECDSA, we were joined by LaKyah Tyner for a paper on threshold BBS+ signing, which is useful for distributed anonymous credential issuance. This paper shares many techniques with our other works. It is available as eprint 2023/602.